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Abstract
This work consists of a theoretical review with the aim of historically framing the way false memories 
have been studied. Although most of the studies on false memories have been developed since the last 
decade of the 20th century, the earliest is dated from the late 19th century. With the aim of pointing out the 
great historical milestones in the research of false memories, the pioneering studies carried out in the 19th 
century, as well as the researches on the effect of the questions on the reports of children and adults, are 
presented. Subsequently, we present the fi rst researches carried out with the specifi c objective of studying 
the effect of suggestive questions on the production of false memories, followed by those who used a 
naturalistic approach and become decisive for the understanding of this phenomenon. In the second 
half of the 20th century, a more cognitive approach takes place, and the paradigms of misinformation 
and DRM arise, which will also be discussed. Throughout the manuscript, it is also refl ected on the 
mechanisms that were considered to be the basis of the production of the false memories, as well as on 
the scientifi c and social implications of this phenomenon.
Keywords: Memory, false memories, memory errors, distortion.
O Estudo das Falsas Memórias: Refl exão Histórica
Resumo
Este trabalho consiste numa revisão teórica com o objetivo de enquadrar historicamente o modo como 
as falsas memórias têm sido estudadas. Embora a maior parte dos estudos sobre falsas memórias tenha 
sido realizada a partir da última década do século XX, os primeiros datam do fi nal do século XIX. 
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Assim, e com o objetivo de assinalar os grandes marcos históricos na investigação das falsas memórias, 
começam por apresentar-se os estudos pioneiros realizados ainda no século XIX, bem como as pesquisas 
realizadas sobre o efeito das perguntas nos relatos de crianças e adultos. Posteriormente, apresentam-se 
as primeiras pesquisas realizadas com o objetivo específi co de estudar o efeito de perguntas sugestivas 
no aparecimento de falsas memórias, seguidas dos estudos que recorreram a uma abordagem naturalista 
tendo-se tornado decisivos para a compreensão deste fenômeno. Já na segunda metade do século XX, 
ganha peso uma abordagem mais cognitivista no estudo deste fenômeno, e surgem os paradigmas da 
desinformação e DRM, que serão também discutidos. Ao longo do texto, refl ete-se também sobre os 
mecanismos que foram considerados como estando na base do aparecimento das falsas memórias, bem 
como sobre as implicações científi cas e sociais deste fenómeno. 
Palavras-chave: Memória, falsas memórias, erros de memória, distorção. 
El Estudio de Memorias Falsas: Refl exión Histórica
Resumen
Este trabajo consiste en una revisión teórica con el objetivo de encuadrar históricamente la forma en que 
las falsas memorias han sido estudiadas. Aunque la mayoría de los estudios sobre falsas memorias se 
han realizado a partir de la última década del siglo XX, los primeros datan del fi nal del siglo XIX. Con el 
objetivo de señalar los grandes hitos históricos en la investigación de las falsas memorias, comienzan por 
presentarse los estudios pioneros realizados aún en el siglo XIX, así como las investigaciones realizadas 
sobre el efecto de las preguntas en los informes de niños y adultos. Posteriormente, se presentan las 
investigaciones realizadas con el objetivo específi co de estudiar el efecto de preguntas sugestivas en 
las falsas memorias, seguidas de los estudios que recurrieron a un abordaje naturalista y se tornaran 
decisivos para la comprensión de este fenómeno. En la segunda mitad del siglo XX, gana peso un 
enfoque más cognitivista en el estudio de este fenómeno y surgen los paradigmas de la desinformación 
y DRM. Durante el texto, se refl eja también sobre los mecanismos que se consideraron como la base 
de la aparición de las falsas memorias, así como sobre las implicaciones científi cas y sociales de este 
fenómeno.
Palabras clave: Memoria, memoria falsa, errores de memoria, distorsión.
When we utter phrases such as “I remember 
perfectly”, “it seems like I can still see it” or “I 
remember it as if it were today”, there is a high 
probability of being betrayed by our memory. Al-
though there is a widespread belief that through 
our memory we can accurately and easily access 
the record of facts and events experienced in the 
past, this belief is, at least, exaggerated. While it 
is true that memory allows us, in most situations, 
to functionally access information about the 
past, it is also true that these records are rarely a 
faithful copy of the reality we previously expe-
rienced. So when we speak of memory we must 
assume that it is by its nature reconstructive, not 
a camera-like system that allows events to be re-
corded and then reviewed just as they occurred.
Interestingly, the idea that memory is falli-
ble is accepted and disseminated spontaneously 
and frequently by the majority of people. Expres-
sions like “I completely forgot”, “I never again 
remembered it” or “I cannot remember this”, are 
used by all of us in various situations. That is, 
while on one hand, in some cases, we assume 
that memory is a fallible system, on the other, we 
act as if we could blindly trust it. While remain-
ing paradoxical, the truth is that these two pre-
suppositions well refl ect the history of the study 
of memory in general, and of false memories in 
particular.
False memories refer to the fact that we re-
member events or information that did not hap-
pen, that we did not experience or did not occur 
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as we report them. Although the study of false 
memories has been neglected for several years, 
there is currently a great deal of research in this 
area. Due to the great impact that the results of 
these studies have had on the academic envi-
ronment and also on society, we are often con-
fronted with a great diversity of defi nitions and 
paradigms for their study. In this sense, this ar-
ticle aims to historically frame the study of false 
memories. For this, the historical milestones of 
great relevance in the study of false memories 
will be discussed. 
The First Steps in the Study 
of False Memories - 19th Century
For more than a century, the main purpose 
of human memory research was the study of its 
potentialities (correct recall and recognition), 
with errors detected in the mnemonic process 
considered to be a result of problems/failures in 
the experimental procedure (Roediger, 1996). 
On the other hand, the study of memory er-
rors was mainly centered on errors of omission 
(i.e., forgetfulness), and not so much on errors 
of commission (i.e., distorted recall of events 
or situations that never occurred; Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2005; Roediger & McDermott, 2000). 
Although these two types of errors are related, 
they are viewed differently perspectives, both 
by the population in general and by the scientifi c 
community. If the experience of forgetfulness is 
familiar to most people, the assumption that a 
particular memory may be false is a process that 
is viewed reluctantly and accepted only by irre-
futable evidence (e.g., photographs). However, 
the earliest experimental studies, of both omis-
sion errors and commission errors, did not differ 
for more than a decade. 
Thus, in 1885, in what is referred to by 
many authors as the fi rst experimental study in 
memory (e.g., Roediger & Gallo, 2004; Roedi-
ger & McDermott, 2000; Ruacter-Vargas, 1991; 
Schacter 1995) 1964), Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) 
conducted a series of experiments that led him 
to formulate the curve of forgetting. Only nine 
years later, Kirkpatrick (1894) performed what 
is also considered to be the fi rst laboratory study 
of false memories (e.g., Gallo, 2006; Roediger, 
Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). In this 
study, Kirkpatrick (1894) made the fi rst experi-
mental demonstrations of false recall of words 
associated with previously presented items:
There were some incidental cases of false 
recall. About a week before . . . I had said 
ten words to the students. Many of these 
were evoked and placed on the lists as if 
they were part of it. Again, it seems that 
when words such as “roll”, “thimble” and 
“knife” were pronounced, many students 
thought of “thread”, “needle” and “fork”, 
which are so often associated with them. 
The result was that many of these words 
were evoked as belonging to the list. This is 
an excellent illustration of how things sug-
gested to a person during an experience can 
be honestly reported by that person as part 
of that experience. (pp. 608-609)
Despite this temporal proximity, the direc-
tions that the research into these two types of er-
rors (i.e., omission and commission) took were 
quite different. For many decades, the so-called 
“Ebbinghaus tradition” increased, with the ma-
jority of studies performed aiming to compre-
hend the mechanisms underlying correct recall 
and recognition, as well as avoid errors (of omis-
sion) associated with these tasks (Bruce & Win-
ograd, 1998; Gallo, 2006). 
Nevertheless, some works on false memo-
ries can be found from the late nineteenth cen-
tury, albeit with the aim of understanding the 
normative functioning of memory. In 1900 Bi-
net, after presenting a set of objects to children, 
introduced misleading information in the form 
of questions in which he suggested, for example, 
the existence of objects that had not been pre-
sented. With the results of this procedure, Binet 
concluded that the suggestive questions caused 
the appearance of memory distortions (e.g., re-
call of objects suggested in the questions). From 
this and other studies on autosuggestion, Binet 
proposed the distinction between false memories 
derived from autosuggestion and false memories 
resulting from suggestion (external). His train-
ing in Law and the consequent contact with the 
legal world allowed Binet to observe the effect 
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of questions in the reports made by adults, and 
especially by children, as they were identifi ed 
as being more susceptible to the effect of ex-
ternal suggestion, a fact that would come to be 
corroborated by studies conducted over a cen-
tury later (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Binet 
(1900) also found that there was no relationship 
between a witness’s conviction and the accuracy 
of the information recalled, a fact also evidenced 
by several more recent studies (e.g., Wells & 
Lindsay, 1985; Wells & Olson, 2003). 
The Infl uence of Suggestion – First 
Decade of the 20th Century
Using scenarios performed in the classroom 
context followed by suggestive questions, 
Stern (1910) showed the possibility of children 
confusing real events with imagined events. His 
studies aimed to understand how the suggestions 
made by adults could produce memory distortions 
in children (cf. Neufeld, Brust, & Stein, 2010; 
Roediger & McDermott, 2000; Schacter, 1995). 
For this, Stern staged an event in his classroom. 
The class was interrupted by a man entering the 
room and addressing Stern. While he was talking 
to the professor, the man would take a book off 
the table and leave the room. A week later, the 
students were invited to recall the event. Some 
participants recalled the event following the 
narrative method, while others were subjected to 
a set of questions. 
The results revealed that the participants 
who were subjected to the narrative method re-
membered the information wrongly in 25% of 
the cases, whereas 50% of the participants sub-
ject to the interrogative method made mistakes 
when recalling the event. 
With these experiences, Stern (1910) con-
cluded that it is possible to create memory er-
rors with the use of suggestive questions. These 
conclusions highlighted the importance of the 
questioning performed, especially with children, 
when the intention is to recall information. This 
can be especially critical when trying to ascer-
tain the real facts, as in the police and forensic 
contexts.
Bartlett and the Naturalist 
Approach – The 1930s Decade
In 1932, Bartlett published Remembering: 
A Study in Experimental Social Psychology, 
in which he presented several experiments 
that demonstrated the existence of memory 
distortions. Aware of the work of Ebbinghaus, 
Bartlett also became his critic. While recognizing 
the advantages of his method, notably with 
respect to the ability to objectively evaluate the 
participants’ answers, Bartlett considered that 
the materials used by Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) 
were far from reality and devoid of meaning, 
thus, not allowing the assessment of the effect of 
previous knowledge on the results of the memory 
tasks that the participants performed. In this 
way, maintaining the objectivity of the method, 
he proposed to study memory using complex 
materials rich in meaning, materials that could 
mirror the everyday situations of the participants 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Ruíz-Vargas, 1991). 
In his best known experiment, Bartlett 
(1932/1997) presented to the participants a 
version of a North American Indian tale entitled 
The War of the Ghosts. As well as being a 
narrative and, as such, complex material rich in 
meaning, the story has other particularities that 
were decisive in Bartlett’s choice: it came from 
a culture alien to the participants (Cambridge 
students); it contained unfamiliar, appealing 
characters, in particular, the supernatural 
entities; and had an open narrative structure. For 
Bartlett, these characteristics would be capable 
of enhancing the appearance of results that 
other kinds of material (such as the meaningless 
syllables used by Ebbinghaus) did not trigger, 
because they allowed the participants some 
freedom of interpretation of the story (Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2005). The participants were asked 
to read the story (which occurred twice). After 
fi fteen minutes, the participants performed a 
written, free recall task. This remembrance 
task was repeated after a few hours, days, 
weeks, months, or even years, according to 
the convenience of the participants and the 
researcher, with no great concern on the part of 
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standardizing the retention intervals (Bartlett, 
1932/1997). 
This “experimental freedom” is also 
mirrored in the way the results of the experiments 
were exposed: Bartlett presented excerpts from 
certain response protocols in a descriptive manner 
and without any attempt at systematization or 
quantifi cation. Bartlett noted that, in some cases, 
the participants omitted details while others 
added them and, in the latter case, the new 
information was information that was familiar to 
the participant (i.e., congruent with their mental 
schemata). As far as Bartlett’s distortions were 
concerned, they varied in magnitude, that is, 
simple language changes without modifi cation 
of meaning, normalizations (e.g., to substitute an 
activity described in the story for a more familiar 
one), inferences (e.g., from the information 
presented), and cases of pure addition, that is, 
cases in which the participants reported entirely 
new facts, however, consistent with the original 
story. Bartlett also noted the existence of a high 
congruence between initial and subsequent 
recall in the sense that the version of the story 
recalled the fi rst-time, with all errors of omission 
and commission, tended to persist over time 
(Bartlett, 1932/1997; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).
Based on these results, Bartlett (1932/1997) 
concluded that recall is a reconstructive pro-
cess, guided by preexisting, general, organiz-
ing schemata. That is, Bartlett found that in his 
study, although the general script of the story 
was maintained, the participants tended to omit 
details that were not congruent with their pre-
existing schemata and to fi ll in the gaps created 
by forgetfulness with familiar information (i.e., 
preexisting in their mental schemata). When the 
presented material was not congruent with these 
mental schemata, the stimuli were reinterpreted 
according to them. This process resulted in a 
schematized and distorted version of the original 
version of the story that, once told, tended to be 
repeated (Roediger & McDermott, 2000; Ruíz-
Vargas, 1991).
These experiments served to distinguish 
the concepts of reproductive memory and 
reconstructive memory. Reproductive memory 
has been defi ned as referring to situations in 
which a precise and faithful reproduction of 
the information stored in the memory occurs, 
whereas reconstructive memory refers to 
those cases where, in the recall process, new 
information is integrated, giving rise to errors of 
various types (Bartlett, 1932/1997). 
Later, other authors (e.g., Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995) argued that memory 
is reconstructive by nature. According to 
Roediger and McDermott (1995), any recall is 
a construction, and its greater or lesser precision 
can depend on the material to be remembered 
(e.g., its nature, its complexity, or the sensory 
modalities involved). However, this will always 
be a quantitative rather than a qualitative 
difference. According to Surprenant and Neath 
(2009), the principle of reconstruction is one 
of the seven principles of memory functioning. 
For these authors, the principle of reconstruction 
applies to the various memory systems and is 
independent of the type of mnemonic task, the 
time scale, the type of materials/stimuli and even 
the type of processing.
Despite the importance currently attributed 
to Bartlett’s studies, they did not have a major 
impact at the time they were published, because 
they did not fi t the dominant paradigm, still 
strongly infl uenced by Ebbinghaus, both in rela-
tion to the method and to the subject under study. 
On one hand, the naturalist nature of his approach 
was not in line with the tradition of laboratory 
studies, and on the other, the researchers’ theo-
retical concerns focused on memory as a system 
capable of coding, storing and recovering large 
quantities of information and not on its possible 
failures or limitations (Schacter, 1995). 
The Importance of the Association 
– 1950s and 1960s
The works published by Deese in 1959 re-
mained practically ignored until the 1990s. Deese 
(1959a, 1959b) developed a procedure analo-
gous to that used by Ebbinghaus (1885/1964). 
The procedure consisted of presenting lists of 
words to which the participants were to pay as 
much attention as possible, since they would 
be asked to recall them later. However, unlike 
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Ebbinghaus, Deese not only investigated correct 
recall, but had the study of intrusions as the main 
aim, that is, the recall of words not presented in 
the lists. The results of the studies revealed that 
participants tended to evoke words that were not 
on the list presented. These words were often 
strongly associated with the words that consti-
tuted the list presented. Following his results, 
Deese (1959b) proposed the idea of association, 
as an alternative to the notion of schema previ-
ously advanced by Bartlett, as an explanation for 
the errors produced in recall tasks. 
Five years after Deese’s studies, and also 
using a procedure based on the presentation of 
word lists, Underwood (1965) replicated his re-
sults, however, this time in recognition tasks. 
Underwood’s (1965) procedure consisted of 
presenting a list of 200 words and then asking 
participants to rate each word as new or old. 
That is, whenever the word had not yet been pre-
sented (during the presentation of this list of 200 
words), the participant had to identify it as new. 
On the other hand, if the word had already been 
presented in the course of this procedure, the 
participant had to identify it as old. The author 
verifi ed that, after presenting a certain number 
of words, the participants tended to recognize as 
old words that, being new, were related to the 
words already presented. Underwood then ar-
gued that false alarms arose from an implicit as-
sociative response that occurred during the study 
phase (presentation) of the associated words. 
That is, as certain words were presented, other 
related words were activated mentally and coded 
as if they were words that had already been pre-
sented. Thus, when these words were presented 
in the list, they were classifi ed as old (Under-
wood, 1965). 
At the end of the 1960s, Neisser (1967) 
published the book Cognitive Psychology and 
rekindled the interest in the notions of sche-
ma and reconstructive memory, advocated by 
Bartlett (1932/1997). According to Neisser, re-
membering would not be exclusively a process 
of retrieving a trace of stored memory, but rather 
a reconstructive process in which people use 
information and preexisting schemata to give 
meaning to memory fragments that remain from 
the original memory. In parallel with the publi-
cation of this work, other authors began to study 
the occurrence of errors in information retention, 
using prose material (e.g., Bransford & Franks, 
1971; Cofer, 1973), inspired by Bartlett’s work. 
The Studies of Loftus and the Nature 
of the Term False Memories
In the 1970s, several studies developed 
by Elizabeth Loftus and colleagues constituted 
a landmark in the history of the study of false 
memories. In their experiments, Loftus and col-
laborators aimed to study eyewitness testimony. 
To do so, they developed the paradigm of misin-
formation or misleading information, according 
to which it is possible to distort the memory of 
information and events by introducing false in-
formation (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). 
The experimental procedure of this 
paradigm consists of presenting images/
videos of a road accident (coding phase). The 
researcher then poses a set of questions about 
the accident to the participants, some of which 
include misleading/false information. Finally, 
participants are asked to remember the maximum 
possible information initially presented, both 
through an recall task and a recognition task. 
The results revealed that participants tended to 
accept the false information that was introduced 
by the researcher in the questions as being true. 
These experiments revealed that it is possible, in 
the laboratory context, to distort the memories 
of situations witnessed and coded by the 
participants (e.g., Loftus, 1975; Loftus & Palmer, 
1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975). The term false 
memory was used by Loftus at the 1992 meeting 
of the American Psychology Society, under the 
theme “Remembering Repressed Abuse”, with 
precisely that meaning. At this meeting, Loftus 
presented some studies, according to which it 
would be possible to implant memories for non-
occurrences, and questioned the possibility that 
some of the memories of childhood sexual abuse 
could be implanted by suggestion and, as such, 
constitute the status of false memories (Pezdek 
& Lam, 2007). This topic had great relevance 
and visibility at the time. However, to explain 
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this interest in false memories, other aspects 
that go beyond the limits of scientifi c research 
must be taken into account. It was in 1992 that 
an organization was set up in the United States 
to support families who had been affected by 
“False Memories Syndrome” cases. 
False Memories Syndrome is the term used 
to describe cases in which a patient “remembers” 
memories of sexual abuse that he or she allegedly 
suffered during childhood, which are then prov-
en to be false. Many of these cases would have 
arisen in the United States following therapeu-
tic processes developed using the model called 
“Recovered-Memory Therapy”. Proponents 
of this therapeutic model claimed to be able, 
through techniques such as hypnosis, regression 
or imagination, to recover memories, especially 
memories of sexual abuse that occurred during 
childhood. These memories, however repressed, 
would be responsible for many of the problems 
that had arisen during adulthood, such as depres-
sion or alcoholism (Kaplan & Manicavasagar, 
2001; Pinto, Pureza, & Feijó, 2010). 
This phenomenon had already been de-
scribed by Freud, about a hundred years earlier. 
In his infantile seduction theory, Freud argued 
that the cause of the psychoneuroses of his adult 
patients lay in the occurrence of traumatic ex-
periences of child seduction and sexual abuse, 
experiences that patients reported during psy-
choanalysis sessions. Later, Freud himself stated 
that many of the patients’ reports were false (for 
a historical analysis of the relevant theory and 
reference, see Macmillan, 1997). 
The effect of some of the techniques used 
in the recovered-memory therapy was therefore 
not new, as Binet had described the power of 
suggestion in altering memories in children 
as early as 1900, however, these cases greatly 
increased interest in the subject, triggering a 
number of studies dedicated to understanding it 
(e.g., Conway, Collins, Gathercole, & Anderson, 
1996; Goldstein, 1997; Heaps & Nash, 1999; 
Hyman & Billings, 1998; Hyman, Husband, & 
Billings, 1995; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Larsen 
& Conway, 1997; Loftus, 1993, 1997; Paddock 
& Terranova, 2001; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 
1997; Pezdek & Hinz, 2002; Pezdek & Hodge, 
1999; Poole, Lindsay, Memon, & Bull, 1995). 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
and the Affi rmation of False 
Memories as an Area of Study 
In 1995 the article “Creating False Memo-
ries: Remembering Words Not Presented in 
Lists” was published by Roediger and McDer-
mott. In this paper, Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) presented the results of the replication of 
the study by Deese (1959b), however, this time, 
contrary to what happened with the original 
study, the impact on the scientifi c community 
was immense. Following the same procedure 
and reaching similar conclusions, this para-
digm of false memories became known as DRM 
(Deese-Roediger-McDermott), in recognition of 
its authors.
The disparity of reactions to similar results, 
with more than 30 years between them, may 
have had much more to do with the environment 
and the scientifi c interests that characterized 
each of the moments of the publication of the 
articles than with the characteristics of the 
works in question. In the late 1950s, memory 
errors were seen as mishaps that occurred during 
memory experiments, which researchers had to 
deal with. Thirty years later, these same errors 
had achieved their own status in the scientifi c 
research on memory, occupying a prominent 
place (Roediger, 1996). The fact is that, prior 
to the publication of the article by Roediger and 
McDermott (1995), studies had been performed 
in which the procedure originally developed by 
Deese (1959b) was used to study false memories. 
This paradigm is distinguished from 
others (e.g., the paradigm of misinformation or 
misleading information), because false memories 
are produced internally, by association effect 
(Mazzoni, 2002) and not by phenomena external 
to the participant (e.g., introduction of suggestive 
information). That is, memory is organized in a 
semantic network and the processing of a piece 
of information leads to the activation of other 
pieces of information associated with it (Meade, 
Watson, Balota, & Roediger, 2007; Roediger, 
Balota, & Watson, 2001).
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The popularity of this paradigm is due, 
not only to the simplicity of its application 
(presentation of lists of words), but also to 
the robustness of the effects found in various 
experimental conditions and especially to the 
knowledge that false memories can even occur 
in apparently very simple tasks, using low 
complexity materials, such as lists of words 
(Gallo, 2010). 
Conclusion
Although the main focus of memory re-
search is the identifi cation of its potentialities 
and capabilities, namely through the study and 
analysis of correct recall or recognition of infor-
mation, the production of errors and distortions 
of memory has not been neglected. Although ini-
tially studies of memory errors or distortions fo-
cused on forgetting, attention later shifted to so-
called commission errors (i.e., false memories). 
With the emergence of various studies in the 
context of false memories, several experimental 
paradigms emerged, such as the DRM paradigm 
or the disinformation paradigm. In this context, 
several paradigms have served as the basis for 
the study of false memories (cf. Oliveira & Al-
buquerque, 2015). In the same way that the stud-
ies of Deese (1959b) were precursors to the use 
of word lists in the production of false memo-
ries, the use of more complex material, such as 
the suggestive questions used by Binet (1900), 
or the stories used by Bartlett (1932/1997), was 
followed, giving rise to the creation and devel-
opment of other paradigms of which the disin-
formation paradigm (Loftus & Palmer, 1974), or 
the false narrative paradigm (Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995) are examples. 
Currently, the concept of false memory is 
not consensual, as researchers who use different 
paradigms to study this phenomenon defi ne it 
differently. Despite the controversy that the 
use of this term has generated (and continues 
to generate), its use became popular and it is 
currently used in a virtually indiscriminate way to 
designate effects that, for several decades, were 
termed errors, illusions or memory distortions. 
At present, the term false memories is used to 
characterize either the recall of events that 
never occurred or the distorted recall of events, 
that is, in a different form from the information 
originally processed (DePrince, Allard, Oh, & 
Freyd, 2004; Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). 
The results and conclusions of the 
experimental studies on false memories have 
had repercussions in society in general, since it 
became evident that all individuals are subject to 
this type of error, which can have unpredictable 
negative consequences. Above all, it should be 
noted that the study of the production of false 
memories was important in the sense that the 
understanding of mnesic errors allowed a better 
understanding of the functioning of memory. 
Through the research, advances and discoveries 
of these studies, the scientifi c community and 
society in general, have a wide knowledge about 
the processes of retention, codifi cation and 
recovery (correct and false) of information. 
Understanding the functioning of memory, 
in particular the study of false memories, is es-
sential for the performance of the psychologist. 
This is because the production of a false memory 
can have negative implications, particularly in 
the clinical and forensic context. The reliability 
of the reports and testimonies of patients, sus-
pects or victims of crime can be compromised by 
the production of false memories. Thus, it is pos-
sible for patients, suspects or victims of crime 
to report information/events in a different way 
from reality, unintentionally distorting facts, 
conditioning and compromising their veracity. 
Currently, the occurrence of false memories is 
a phenomenon widely investigated in forensic 
psychology since the majority of the judicial 
systems worldwide use eye-witness as a source 
for decision making. If, in most situations, the 
occurrence of a false memory may be innocuous, 
there are cases in which it may be of extreme 
importance.
In this sense, and for the reasons mentioned, 
it is very important that the phenomenon of 
the production of false memories be taken into 
account during the practice of the psychologist.
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